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Divine Command Theory and Metaethics1
Teoria do Mandamento Divino e Metaética
ALCINO EDUARDO BONELLA(*) 
Abstract
I will outline an application of metaethics to the debate 
about Euthyphro’s dilemma and divine command theory 
(DCT). Metaethics elucidates how we should understand 
what are objective moral judgments and moral truths. 
I argue that the normative content of morality does not 
depend on God’s approval/command. This is so because 
moral objectivity does not depend on any approval and 
command, what I try to show by the nature and the lo-
gic of evaluative/normative concepts (good, bad, right, 
wrong, ought to etc.). Other aspects related to DCT and 
morality are briefly debated.
Keywords: Metaethics. Moral Objectivity. Divine 
Command Theory. Subjectivism.
Resumo
Esboçarei uma aplicação da metaética ao debate sobre 
dilema de Eutífron e teoria do mandamento divino. A me-
taética elucida como devemos entender o que são juízos 
morais objetivos e verdades morais. Arguirei que o con-
teúdo normativo da moralidade não depende da aprova-
ção ou mandamento de Deus. Isto é assim porque a obje-
tividade moral não depende de quaisquer aprovações ou 
comandos, o que tento provar pela natureza e lógica dos 
conceitos normativos/avaliativos (como bom, mal, certo, 
erado, deve-se etc.). Outros aspectos ligados à teoria do 
mandamento divino e à moralidade são brevemento de-
batidos.
Palavras-chaves: Metaética. Objetividade Moral. Teoria 
do Mandamento Divino. Subjetivismo.
1  An initial version of this paper was discussed in the Seminar on Natural Theology and Existence of God, 
Brasilia, UnB, 2015. I thank very much Prof. Aguinaldo Portugal (National University of Brasilia - UnB), 
the Organizer. I also thank critical comments from Nelson Gomes (UnB), Richard Swinburne (Oxford 
University) and Rodrigo Rocha Silveira (UnB), on that occasion. [Reseacrh supported by CNPq (PQ), 
FAPEMIG].
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Divine Command Theory and Metaethics
Divine command theory (DCT) is an obvious option for theists in ethics and phi-
losophy or religion. While for most religious theists God’s commands determine what is 
required, prohibited or permitted to do, for most moral philosophers DCT holds that an 
action is morally right/good if and only if God commands/approves it. The main chal-
lenge to DCT comes from so called Euthyphro’s dilemma, a dilemma Plato poses in the 
dialog Euthyphro. There, Socrates asked Euthyphro: do the gods love actions because 
they are pious, or actions are pious because the gods love them? That is the same we can 
ask today before DCT, according to Shafer-Landau (2015: 67): Does God command us 
to do actions because they are morally right, or the actions are morally right because God 
commands them? (Shafer-Landau 2015: 67). Here the Argument from Euthyphro’s dilem-
ma according to him (2015:69): 
1) “Either God has reasons that supports His commands, or God lacks reasons for His 
commands.
2) If God has not reasons for His commands, then God’s commands are arbitrary – and that 
renders God imperfect, undermining His moral authority.
3) If God has reasons that supports His commands, then these reasons, rather than the 
divine commands, are what make actions right or wrong - thereby refuting the Divine 
Command Theory.
4) Therefore, or God is imperfect, or the Divine Command Theory is false.
5) God is not imperfect.
6) Therefore, the Divine Command Theory is false.”
Some theists and ethical objectivists think morality depends necessarily on exis-
tence of God and His divine approval/command, without which it could not have sound 
foundations. Call this a dependence thesis, the natural position of theists before the Eu-
thyphro’s dilemma Argument. They argue that if God does not exist, we have not a sound 
foundation for morality, but if theism is true, we have. For them objective moral values, 
objective moral duties, and objective moral accountability depend on divine approval/
command (cf. Craig 2009: 30-31, 168-176). Here an Argument from Theism:
1) If objective morality is illusory, then God does not exist.
2) God exists.
3) Therefore, objective morality is not illusory. 
Some atheists and ethical skeptics take a similar path arguing against the existence 
of objective morality (cf. Shafer-Landau 2004: 75, 140). In fact many people think only 
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God could be the source of the objective morality, and, as they do not think God exist, 
they conclude that morality is not objective. We can put here the Argument from Atheism: 
1) Morality is objective only if God exists.
2) God does not exist.
3) Therefore, morality is not objective. 
The first premise in the arguments from theism/atheism is very problematic, for 
both atheists and theists. Morality could be objective even if God does not exist. For one 
hand, skeptics and atheists take many laws as objective, even they have not an author or 
lawmaker. This includes normative standards of logic and reasoning. So, skeptics and 
atheists do not need to think that moral laws must have an author or a lawmaker for being 
objective. For the other hand, if morality is not an independent standard for the subject’s 
approval (I mean, for his particular will and command), there would not be clear reason 
for taking His Will and Command as morally important, and so, no clear reason to call 
God an all-good God: that God is good would be something like “God approves God”. 
Why to adore God for this? Leibniz and Kant suggested this: if it is the will alone, com-
pletely free from any moral standard, the divine morality is only a matter of power, and 
right ca not come out might, what undermines any reasonable motive to admire God. 
According to Leibinz, (1991) in his Discourse on Metaphysics: 
“So in saying that things are not good by any rule of goodness, but sheerly by the will of 
God, it seems to me that one destroys, without realizing, all the love of God and all His 
glory. Why praise Him for what He has done, if He would be equally praiseworthy in doing 
exactly the contrary?” (quoted in Rachels 2003: 51-52)
The problem is that the argument from theism/atheism has a bad assumption: that 
objective morality needs approval/command from someone. But moral objectivity does 
not need it. Moral objectivity does not require, logically, any particular approval and 
command. As other common forms of objectivity, it requires only facts and logic. Facts 
are objective, and logic disciplines what follows from what in moral sentences. Assume, 
for sake of the argument, that a certain moral conclusion, based on non-moral (natural) 
facts and logic, is a better conclusion than another one. Why this would not be a sufficient 
reason for a moral truth? Moral truth would not be like natural truth about planets, but it 
would not be like arbitrary desires. Moral truth would be a kind of rational truth (se for 
this Rachels 2003, p. 41).
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Divine Command Theory and Metaethics
Contemporary metaethics offers explanations about the nature and logic of evalua-
tive words, and establish what we are doing when we emit moral judgments. Philoso-
phers do this with philosophical theses and argumentation, and thus metaethics is a good 
rational tool to elucidate how we should understand what objective moral judgments and 
moral truths mean. I assume here that such metaethical theses can be applied to the debate 
about DCT, rendering good fruits. 
Consider three important aspects of moral judgments as commonly used, and with 
which any meta-ethical theory has to deal. (1) Moral judgments refer to non-moral facts 
(actions, rules, institutions, agents etc.); they have a predicative function and a descriptive 
meaning. (2) Moral judgments evaluate these facts (actions, rules etc.) and have so a prac-
tical function and a non-descriptive meaning. (3) There is a necessary covariance between 
moral properties M (good, right, bad, wrong, for example) of actions, agents, institutions, 
etc., and its non-moral or natural properties N, a necessary logical covariance called the 
supervenience (S) of moral properties. 
All the time we have MN covariations (or dependencies) in our moral judgments. 
This is S. According to S, there must necessarily be some non-moral difference between 
two situations if we express different moral judgments about them. A meta-ethical theory 
falls or not depending on accommodation and coherent explanation of S. The accommo-
dation and explanation of S in a given theory make it possible, for example, that impossi-
ble moral worlds may exist. If yes, it is a bad theory. But the theory that good means what 
is approved by the subject makes it possible. Then, it is a bad theory. (see Bonella 2016). 
Since subjectivism is a bad metaethical theory, DCT is also a bad theory, because, taken 
as a metaehical theory, DCT is a kind of subjectivism, one that goodness and rightness is 
completely dependent on the attitudes and beliefs of a particular subject/observer, God.2
Subjectivists argue that moral judgments cannot be objectively true because they 
make the content of moral beliefs necessarily relative to the opinions and approvals of 
the individuals (subjects) who possess them.  In Subjectivism, when a subject S states 
“genocide is wrong”, he is reporting that he disapproves of genocide. If he really does, 
the judgment is true, but true for this subject. If he does not disapprove, the judgement is 
false, and, in that case, subjectivists must say it is not true that “genocide is wrong”.  Its 
content will never be true regardless of the opinion or approval of the subject of approba-
2 “This is worth pointing out, since theory is often seen as the arch-nemesis of cultural relativism, whereas 
in fact the two are variants on the same basic metaethical approach” (Huemer, 2005, p. 54-55)
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tion. Both nihilism (there are not moral truths) and subjectivism (moral truths depend on 
subjective approbation) share the denial that there are objective moral truths, truths that 
are independent of individual subjective opinions.
Huemer (2005, p. 48) explains subjectivism is a kind of metaethical reductionism: 
it takes moral properties as reducible to psychological properties, the main idea being that 
the attitudes or reactions of someone makes an object, good. For him, “x is good” equates 
“the speaker approves of x”, and an example of subjectivist theory is DCT, where “x is 
right” equates “x accords with God’s wishes”. According to Rachels, subjectivism states 
that “X is morally acceptable” means “I (the speaker) approve X”, “X is morally unaccep-
table” means “I (the speaker) disapprove X” (2013, p. 34). In a similar way, according to 
Craig, about moral obligations, DCT states, 
“for any agent S and action A: 
A is required of S if and only if a just and loving God commands S to do A”. 
“A is permitted for S if and only if a just and loving God does not command S not to do A”. 
“A is forbidden to S if and only if a just and loving God commands S not to do A” (2009, 
p. 172).3
In metaethical subjectivism, a possible world, with the same natural properties as 
another world, could have different moral values and moral truths depending solely on 
the approval or disapproval by the subjects present in these worlds. Even inside a unique 
world, there could be different values and moral truths with the same natural properties. 
One action, in the future, with the same natural properties as now, or in the past, could 
have its moral content modified from right to wrong (or from wrong to right) regardless 
the objective facts being the same. Naturally identical worlds (such as having genocidal 
national leaders), may be, if subjectivism is true, morally approved/disapproved in dif-
ferent ways, via particular decisions, which do not depend on descriptive properties of 
genocide, for example. So, a simple subjectivist approval also cannot be disciplined by 
logic (in this case, by the logic of prescriptive universalizability, what follows from S. For 
this see Hare 1999), since evaluative properties depend on arbitrary decisions of subjects. 
3 Craig differentiates moral values, based on God’s nature, and moral duties, based on God’s commands, 
calling our attention that values have its content in objective good nature of God, while duties receive 
objectivity from commands. But the subjectivist structure is the same. See that Rachels is talking about 
“wrong” and “right”, not only “good and bad”. See below about to beg the question using God’s good na-
ture strategy before Euthyphro dilemma.
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Compare with rationalist objectivism: good is a concept (or word) we use to ex-
press objective evaluations (evaluations disciplined by prescriptive universalizability and 
reasoning). We cannot think good a situation 1, and bad a situation 2, if 1 and 2 have the 
same non-evaluative or descriptive features: it would be like to call red a singular car, 
and after call yellow another singular one, that have, both, the same universal properties, 
including the same color. My children would not learn to use red or good, and they could 
not learn what they ought to do if a situation 2 is bad (or the action 2 is wrong), and the 
situation 1 is good (the action 1 is right), having both the same (universal) descriptive 
properties. This explains S easily, and it is a candidate for a good metaethical theory.
Since evaluative/normative concepts/words (good, right, bad, wrong etc.) superve-
nes facts, they implies this principal logical aspect (S), one aspect that gives us a logic of 
the moral words we use in our thinking and discourse, the logic of prescriptive universa-
lizability. So, conjoining facts and logic render rational objectivity (see Hare 1997, 1999). 
The ethical rationalist think “genocide is wrong” as something really wrong and true re-
gardless of subjective opinion or subjective attitude on whether it is wrong or not. The ju-
dgment “genocide is wrong” express an objective evaluation that all of us who mobilizes 
logically moral judgments would, by the light of facts about genocide, endorse. A moral 
judgement that all moral thinkers (God included) can endorse if they are thinking logi-
cally (universalizability) by the light of facts (universal properties of the actions, agents 
etc.) is an objective moral prescription. The reason instantiated in this objective prescrip-
tion lies in the facts-cum-logic instance(s), not in the commands and approvals instances.
This rationalist conception of moral truth is part of ethical objectivism, and moral 
truth is agent-neutral: it requires rational arguments by the light of facts as evidence for 
truths. Here there is not begging question against theism or atheism: God can exist and 
you can believe in God, or God cannot exist and you cannot believe, but moral truth is 
objectively there, independent of your opinions and God’s opinions. Then, nihilism is not 
the unique option if we do not believe in God and have no divine commands. On the same 
way, theistic and religious objectivism is not the unique option if we believe in objective 
morality. These are good reasons for theists and atheists agree with it, and it seems good 
that rational theism could accept that there are independent moral reasons that grounds 
moral judgments and moral truths.
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Theist philosopher Richard Swinburne takes partially this path. In his paper “What 
Difference Does God Make to Morality?”, Swinburne affirms there are reasons that grou-
nd necessary moral truths, and that such are independent reasons we can discover from 
experience and reflection. These reasons and necessary moral truths do not depend on the 
existence of God (see Swinburne 2009, pp. 151-155, 156-157). The reason Hitler was a 
bad man lies in what he did (genocide, for example), in our social experience with this 
kind of acts (of genocidal leaders) and in the moral reflection about similar cases. These 
normative reasons argue contra Hitler and pro humanitarian leaders, and all this renders 
moral truth independent of existence of God. Other possible world with the same facts 
will have the same moral truth and God could not changes this, so, the will of God is not 
the main point in the immorality of genocide and genocidal leaders. William Craig seems 
to take, also partially, a similar path, claiming that theists agree that we do not need to 
know God neither to believe in God to discern objective moral values and moral obliga-
tions. (see Craig 2005, p. 645) 
Despite of this acceptance, Craig thinks, since God is the unique ontological ground 
for objective morality and for the content of morality (that has been stablished by divine 
commands), God makes great difference to objective morality. Human morality should be 
based on divine commands, and, since for Craig Christian theism is true, human morality 
depends on Bible commands. More: Divine commands do not obligate God himself. As 
the Supreme Being, God could command us to do acts that would be immoral without 
his command. I call this a pure DCT: God creates the right and wrong by His commands. 
Meanwhile, since God’s nature is all-good, and God’s will is holy, God will not state 
immoralities, Craig thinks. In an apparently conflation between ontology and metaethics, 
Craig thinks to have solved Euthyphro’s dilemma: God will not have (by definition) im-
moral commands. Because God is morally perfect, the challenge of arbitrariness would 
not follow. Torture will be wrong in all possible worlds because God will exist in all these 
worlds with His same all-good nature. (see Craig 2005, p. 645-647).
However, Craig is wrong, that is not the point. If good means (analytically) “what is 
approved by someone”, - or if the good reduces (synthetically) to “what God approves”, 
both conceptions are reductionists and are subjectivists - , then, a same action could be 
approved differently accordingly the subject, even if the non-moral facts of the situation 
are the same. This is a kind of logical arbitrariness. The morality of the action would be 
in the subject’s will, not in the objective facts itself, or in the objective facts-cum-logic 
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reasons. These are problematical moves in metaethics, and are not ontological or moral 
moves. There is, so, a vicious circle in assuming a good nature of God as solving the Eu-
thyphro dilemma: good still means what God commands/approves. Whether a supremely 
good God means (analytically) a God approved by Himself (sic) or means a God with 
the character He has, then in both cases we have a reduction of goodness to what God 
decides. Why should morality lye in God’s nature, or, why the nature of God is morally 
good? Either there are reasons showing that God’s actions, intentions, commands, etc. – 
the features of God’s character/nature – are good, or there are not. If there are, DCT in 
its pure form is false, and we should obey God because God is good in the appropriated 
non-subjectivist sense. If there are not reasons, DCT in its pure form is true but with, at 
least, this strong burden: we should obey God just because He is God. (That is the circle).4
There must be normative reasons for God being a morally good God, and that rea-
sons cannot be that He has a holy will or because his nature makes good his commands 
(this would beg the question), since we need independent evaluative reasons for justify a 
will or a character (nature) as morally good. Goodness, holiness, generosity, equality are 
all evaluative expressions lacking evidence supplementation, the knowledge of non-mo-
ral facts plus the logical reflection to understand which actions or traits of character we 
see as good, holy, etc. in God. Even if an all-good God is the creator of the world, and 
ontologically higher than His creation, since morality is the set of objective moral tru-
4 We should ask what would follow in metaethical terms if God were to command something morally prob-
lematic. For instance, if God were to disapprove of gay marriage (as Craig believes He does, following a 
plausible interpretation of the Bible), or to command that wives should be submissive to their husbands (as 
Swinburne believes He does, also following a plausible interpretation of the Bible). That slaves should be 
submissive to their owners is more than problematic, in my view, but seems to follow the same plausible 
interpretation of the Bible, and, I suppose, Craig and Swinburne should believe this too, but I am not sure. 
If we are sure that God will not command these kind of things, as I think He will not, if He exists, then we 
may still propose plausibly the argument What if He were to command etc., to test its metaehical implica-
tions. But the metaethical implications here depend on what solution we accept – what horn we take - to 
Euthyphro’s dilemma: if God’s commands make an action a right one, then, were God to ask some immoral 
thing, this thing would become obligatory for us. Remember Craig accepts God can state apparently im-
moral actions (because in His perfection, He can), actions that we have no authorization to do without His 
command (sic). It appears to be the reason for Craig seeing as acceptable some God’s commands of geno-
cide or killing a son, found in the Bible. So, God’s commands can make immoral-acts- for-us obligatory. 
“Therefore, God’s moral perfection is not obstacle to his issuing such a command: a morally perfect being 
is not debarred from commanding people to do things that are morally correct as the time he commands 
them” (Huemer 2005, 57). We should note however that many Christians and Jews (and probably Muslims) 
do not take so literally the Bible (or Koran), at least when the passages conflicts with other relevant parts 
of the text. One philosophical position is to take objective morality as a source among many for judging 
interpretations of the Bible. For example Jesus Himself and the author of John’s letters in New Testament 
seems to have taken the idea that the mutual love is the higher criterion to understand commands and other 
moral and religious injunctions. In this sense, autonomous ethics (as other autonomous science) would be 
an objective standard for religious morality, being also a very good metaethics for theism. For autonomy of 
ethics, Euthyphro’s Dilemma, and religious morality, see Brink 2007. 
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ths, God Himself is not normatively necessary for the content itself of moral judgments. 
Therefore, if someone, even God, morally approvals/commands an action, then there will 
necessarily facts-cum-logic instances (the natural facts involved in the situation plus pres-
criptive universalizability) as reasons for this.
However, if someone claims that God is all-good by nature, and thus claims His 
commands would always be prescribing what is good in its appropriated sense - because 
there are reasons for them - then this person is adopting the rationalist solution, and the 
independence thesis for Euthyphro’s dilemma. The right actions are right independently 
(so the name rationalist solution: God commands certain actions because they are right), 
and DCT merely states that if we accepts God’s commands or consult God’s commands, 
we would be doing the right thing. Call this a conciliation interpretation of DCT or miti-
gated DCT. There is no vicious circle here because a good God is a God that follows mo-
rality and morality is an objective standard for evaluating our beliefs about the goodness 
of God.5 Pure DCT holds that right actions are right because God approves/commands 
them, it adopts a voluntarist (subjectivist) solution. In this case, the morality of the action 
would essentially depend on the divine approval or commands, and God would establish 
by will what is right and what is wrong. In this solution is implied the dependence thesis, 
and a pure DCT. 
A lightly different way to argue against pure DCT, a way that poses clearly the me-
taethical implication, we find in Huemer (2005: 58), could give us a bit more help:
1) “If no characteristics of God ground an obligation to obey God’s commands, then there 
is no obligation to obey God’s commands.
2) The morally neutral characteristics of God do not ground an obligation to obey God’s 
commands.
3) If the morally significant characteristics of God ground an obligation to obey his 
commands, then some moral facts are independent of God’s commands and attitudes.
4) If either (a) there is no obligation to obey God’s commands or (b) some moral facts are 
independent of God’s commands and attitudes, then the divine command theory is false.
5) Therefore, the divine command theory is false”.
5 This looks like a solution we find in Robert Adams. God’s commands are moral commands if there ex-
ist a loving God, but a loving God is a God that does not commands wrong actions, being its wrongness 
determined by moral reasons, despite of Adams affirmation of God’s commands a necessary condition for 
an action being right. (see Adams 1981, 1999) For other theories about DCT and metaethics, see Zangwill 
(2015) and Smith (2015).
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In summary, either the features of God Himself (his nature or his will) are mo-
rally neutral or they are morally significant. If morally neutral, like his simple commands 
(imperatives) that we do certain thing or His Omnipotence, then they do not create any 
moral obligation. If morally significant, like His goodness, benevolence, justice, etc., the-
se values are normatively independent and prior to commands and attitudes. As Adams 
suggests, if a god states to murder, he is not a loving God, and has not moral commands 
we need to obey except for non-moral reasons. Maybe that, assumed that all God’s sin-
gular commands are not immoral ones, simple (arbitrary) commands pose at least a good 
non-moral reason to obey, for example, that simply someone asks us to do something or 
to obey.6 If God exists, obviously His wishes and commands are among the wishes that 
any being could ask to us, and this creates a presumption in favor of doing or obeying. 
Why not? Swinburne has suggested something like this: God is a like a father (and for 
Christians He is God the Father) and we in general obey our fathers. God is also a be-
nefactor in giving us existence, and we in general should respond with generosity to our 
benefactors. (see Swinburne 2009: 156-159). This position imply the rationalist solution 
to Euthyphro’s dilemma: only commands that not conflict with morality are accepted, and 
like a human father has moral limits for what he asks his children, God would have mo-
ral limits too. Swinburne accepts this (see page 157), and believes that beyond morality, 
there are other reasons for obeying God’s commands. 
If we believe in moral objectivity, then commands/approvals depend on normative/
evaluative reasons, not the opposite, at least for being morally good commands. Of cou-
rse God, if exists, is good, the most good Being that exists, but the reasons we have for 
saying God is morally good are: the wishes and commands of God have certain features 
that the logic of prescriptive universalizability plus the facts of circumstances constrain 
all rational beings to endorse. Factual experience and logical moral reflection about geno-
cide is what make genocide objectively wrong in a strong moral sense. So, a good God, 
if exists, will necessarily disapproves genocide because genocide is immoral. A good and 
perfect being will think and act accordingly objective morality. If we are looking for mo-
ral objectivity, then commands/approvals depend on normative/evaluative reasons, not 
the opposite.  This, however, is an independent standard for moral reasoning and for the 
normative content of moral truths.
6 Related to non-moral reasons and DCT, See Zangwill 2015. For contemporary metaethics and DCT, see 
also Smith 2015.
Alcino Eduardo Bonella
Revista Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião /  Brasília /  v.2 n.2 / p 162-172 / dez. 2015 / ISSN 2352-8284 172
References
ADAMS, R. “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness”, In: HELM, P. Divine 
Commands and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.
______, R. 1999. Finite and Infinite Goods. New York, Oxford University Press.
BONELLA, A. E. “Realismo normativo não naturalista e mundos morais impossíveis”. In: MOR-
TARI, C. Anais Principia. Florianópolis, UFSC. (No prelo), 2016.
BRINK, D. O. “A autonomia da ética”. In: MARTIN, M. Um mundo sem Deus: ensaios sobre o 
ateísmo. Lisboa: Edições 70, 2007.
CRAIG, W. L. & MORELAND, J. P. Filosofia e Cosmovisão Cristã. São Paulo: Vida Nova, 2005. 
CRAIG, W. L. “This Most Gruesome of Guests”. In: GARCIA, R. K. & KING, N. L. Is Goodness 
without God Good Enough? Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.
HARE, R. Objective Prescriptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
______.  Sorting Out Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
HUEMER, M. Ethical Intuitionism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
KANT, I. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). In: KANT, I. Practical Philosophy: 
The Cambridge Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
LEIBNIZ, G. W. “Discourse on Metaphysics (1686)”. In: LEIBNIZ, G. W. Discourse in Metaphy-
sics and other Essays. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1991.
RACHELS, J. The elements of moral Philosophy. New York: McGrall-Hill, 2003.
SHAFER-LANDAU, R. Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004.
______.  The Fundamentals of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015 
SMITH, M. “Religion and Metaethics”. (forthcoming) . 2015
SWINBURNE, R. “What difference does God Make to Morality?” In: GARCIA, R. K. & KING, 
N. L. Is Goodness without God Good Enough? Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield , Publishers, 2009.
ZANGWILL, N. “Uma saída do dilema de Eutífron”. Revista Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião, 
v. 1 n. 1, 2014.
Recebido em julho de 2015
Aprovado em agosto de 2015
